May 3, 2013

ELNINO MODOKI

“There is an ongoing debate in the scientific literature about whether global warming will lead to more “El Nino-like” circulation changes in the Pacific or not. However, when assessing impacts it is even more important to recognise that not all El Ninos are the same and can produce different climatic responses in countries around the Pacific rim such as New Zealand. 
“The word “Modoki” is a Japanese term to describe something that is “similar but different”, and was first introduced to explain the unusual climate anomalies experienced in Japan in the 2004 El Nino, but the term has only became widely known internationally since 2007. A Modoki El Nino has the maximum sea surface warming in the central equatorial Pacific as opposed to the eastern Pacific (the “classical” El Nino). Modoki El Ninos have become more common since 1990, and other recent research suggests the associated rainfall and temperature anomalies are slightly different for Australia and New Zealand than for the classical eastern Pacific El Nino.







El Nino Modoki Effect on Indian Ocean:
It is a well known climatological fact that during pre-monsoon and post-monsoon seasons in the North Indian Ocean, more cyclones form in the Bay of Bengal compared with the Arabian Sea. Scientists have now discovered why in some years more cyclones form in the Arabian Sea than usual. This is due to a newly discovered Phenomenon (2007) El Nino Modoki — which causes warm moist conditions in the Central Pacific and dry cold conditions in Eastern and western pacific. A more familiar phenomenon, El Nino, was found to suppress cyclone formation in the Arabian Sea.
The reason why El Nino Modoki brings only fewer number of cyclones in the Bay of Bengal is because one of the two descending limbs of the Walker Cell is over the western Pacific and Bay of Bengal. The descending limb causes dry conditions not conducive for cyclone formation. The ascending limb of the Walker Cell, on the other hand, brings rain. Also, an El Nino Modoki creates stronger divergence over the western Pacific and Bay of Bengal compared to El Nino. Divergence (opposite of convergence) means surface winds move away from each other and result in low relative vorticity (rotational flow of winds). These conditions are not conducive for cyclones. This explains why Bay of Bengal region (close to western Pacific) has fewer cyclones during an El Nino Modoki. On the other hand, there is large convergence over the Arabian Sea during an El Nino Modoki explaining the large number of cyclones in that region. A statistical analysis of the El Nino and El Nino Modoki years between 1979-2004 was conducted. It was found that there were four El Nino years and seven El Nino Modoki years during this period.
Only post-monsoon and pre-monsoon periods were chosen for the study. “Cyclones usually do not form during monsoon season. “Atmospheric parameters — low-level relative vorticity, mid-tropospheric relative humidity, vertical wind shear — are not at values conducive for cyclone formation during monsoon. Second, during monsoon there is strong zonal (latitudinal) wind in the form of a jet at lower levels and this is not conducive for cyclone formation as the vertical shear between lower and upper troposphere will not be minimum. Finally, the sea surface temperatures are too low for cyclogenesis.

April 30, 2013

BRAHIMI'S PLAN

Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s failure was spectacular. Following Mr. Annan came the Algerian diplomat, Lakhdar Brahimi, whose frustrations have not been kept secret. On April 19, Mr. Brahimi briefed the Security Council, the text of which was swiftly leaked. The Brahimi statement bemoans the immense suffering of the Syrian people, with 3.5 million refugees outside the country and 6.8 million people in need of aid inside (out of a population of 23 million). Almost half the population of Syria, Mr. Brahimi said, is “gravely affected by the conflict


Brahimi’s Plan
Over the course of the past eight months, Mr. Brahimi has attempted to forge a Syrian Plan. The tide has not favoured this ambition. In the Security Council, Mr. Brahimi laid out five parameters towards a political settlement:
(1) Following the entreaty of the Secretary General of the Security Council, arms flows to all sides must end. These will not stop, however, unless a political process is in the offing.
(2) The opposition must be more united, with the various factions willing to accede to a common, credible leadership. In other words, the tussles between Mr. al-Khatib and Mr. Hitto, magnified by the divisions between their geopolitical allies, need to end, and groups such as al-Nusra need to be harnessed by this opposition or else it will act against any peace process.
(3) The opposition must give up its dreams of military intervention by the West, for it is “neither likely or desirable; nor can such an intervention be provoked.” The recent entente between Turkey and Israel is not a prelude to any major assault, nor is NATO Secretary General Rasmussen’s comment that his alliance remains “extremely vigilant.”
(4) The Assad regime must give up its fantasy of a military victory.
(5) The Assad regime must not believe that the existence of al-Nusra and al-Qaeda will somehow change the geopolitical situation in its favour. The West’s intentions will not be diverted into a grand alliance with the Assad regime to fight al-Qaeda.
A political settlement has been long overdue in this bloody conflict, whose social costs Mr. Brahimi likened to the “exodus of Palestinians from their land in 1948 and 1967.” This is an emotional parallel, but accurate. It tells us a great deal about the intractable nature of the conflict, fanned on by powers from afar that have interests which are not the same as those of the Syrian people.

April 28, 2013

NATIONAL POLICY FOR FARMERS (2007)



1)   ECONOMIC  WELL BEING OF THE FARMER
2)   ASSET REFORMS
3)   WATER USE EFFICIENCY
4)   NEW TECHNOLOGIES
5)   NATIONAL AGRICULTURE BIO SECURITY SYSTEM
6)   SEEDS AND SOIL HEALTH
7)   SUPPORT SERVICES FOR WOMEN
8)   CREDIT AND INSURANCE
9)   GYAN CHAUPALS
10) SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES FOR FARMERS
11) MINIMUM SUPPORT PRICE
12) FOOD SECURITY BASKET

April 26, 2013

NATIONAL YOUTH POLICY 2011

YOUTH has been defined from the age group 16-30 earlier it was 13-35.

The draft youth policy 2011 is built on ten thrust areas

1)  promotion of national values,social harmony and national unity.
2)  empowering youth through employment and entrepreneurship opportunities
3)  education- formal and informal
4)  health related issues and healthy life style
5)  promoting gender justice and equality
6)  participation in community service
7)  preparing adolescents for facing challenges of life
8)  social justice and action against unhealthy social practices
9)  issues related to environment,its conservation and preservation
10)youth and local governance,including support to state sponsored programmes and schemes 

April 20, 2013

South-South Cooperation

           " South-South cooperation far superior than North -South cooperation"


From the time of our emergence as a free nation, we recognised the importance of human resource capacity building as a requirement for economic growth and independent policy making. This recognition informed the course of our cooperation with other developing countries with whom we shared the aspiration of eradicating poverty and under development. The Indian Technical and Economic Assistance programme, ITEC, was launched in 1964 with the objective of sharing our knowledge and skills with fellow developing countries. Over nearly five decades, ITEC and its sister initiatives, the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP) and the Technical Cooperation Scheme of Colombo Plan, have contributed substantially to capacity building in many parts of the world. Last year, nearly 9,000 civilians from 161 countries attended courses in diverse disciplines, conducted by 47 Indian institutions. We offer 2,300 scholarships annually for degree courses in Indian universities. We also run special courses at the request of countries or regions on specialised subjects such as election management, WTO studies, parliamentary practices and public-private partnerships. At the India-Africa Forum Summits in 2008 and 2011, we committed to establishing about 100 institutions in different African countries to strengthen capacities. We depute experts abroad to share expertise in areas like information technology, auditing, pharmacology, public administration and textiles research.

An earlier example is from our Green Revolution, when we shared with Vietnam research on high-yielding rice varieties through exchanges of scientists and the establishment of a Rice Research Institute in southern Vietnam. Today, Vietnam is a major rice exporter and competes with India in world markets. In their structure and diversity, such programmes do not have many parallels in North-South cooperation.
 Over the years, we have expanded our development cooperation portfolio through grant assistance to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka for projects in infrastructure, hydroelectricity, power transmission, and other sectors identified by the host government as priority areas for their development. Another strand has been concessional Lines of Credit. Over the last decade or so, over 150 Lines of Credit totalling over U.S. $9.5 billion have been allocated, financing a wide range of projects from drinking water schemes to power plants to technology parks and railway infrastructure in developing countries.
In all these strands of development assistance, our underlying philosophy remains that which underpins South-South cooperation. Our engagement is demand-driven and responds to the developmental priorities of our partner countries. We do not attach conditionalities, we do not prescribe policies and we do not challenge national sovereignty. We promote a mutually beneficial exchange of development experiences and resources.
There is an acknowledged historical context to Official Development Assistance (ODA), which distinguishes North-South Cooperation from South-South Cooperation. The focus on South-South cooperation in the prevailing international discourse on aid architecture increasingly glosses over this fact. It conveniently overlooks the reality that developing countries, even the so-called emerging economies, continue to confront major economic challenges of their own, exacerbated by the current global economic situation, which place an inherent limitation on their capacity to contribute to international development cooperation. The assistance which developing countries offer to other developing countries should therefore continue to remain voluntary and free from externally imposed norms drawn from North-South Cooperation. Simply put, whereas North-South cooperation is a historic responsibility, South-South cooperation is a voluntary partnership.
Source: (Ranjan Mathai is Foreign Secretary.)

January 22, 2013

WORLD OIL TRANSIT CHOKE POINTS

CHOKE POINTS:

Choke points are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes, some so narrow that restrictions are placed on the size of the vessel that can navigate through them.They are a critical part of global energy security due to the high volume of oil traded through their narrow straits.In 2011, total world oil production amounted to approximately 87 million barrels per day (bbl/d), and over one-half was moved by tankers on fixed maritime routes. By volume of oil transit, the Strait of Hormuz, leading out of the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca, linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, are two of the world's most strategic choke points.The international energy market is dependent upon reliable transport. The blockage of a choke point, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases in total energy costs. In addition, chokepoints leave oil tankers vulnerable to theft from pirates, terrorist attacks, and political unrest in the form of wars or hostilities as well as shipping accidents that can lead to disastrous oil spills. The seven straits highlighted in this brief serve as major trade routes for global oil transportation, and disruptions to shipments would affect oil prices and add thousands of miles of transit in an alternative direction, if even available.



STRAIT OF HORMUZ:

Located between Oman and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil choke point due to its daily oil flow of about 17 million bbl/d in 2011, up from between 15.7-15.9 million bbl/d in 2009-2010. Flows through the Strait in 2011 were roughly 35 percent of all seaborne traded oil, or almost 20 percent of oil traded worldwide. More than 85 percent of these crude oil exports went to Asian markets, with Japan, India, South Korea, and China representing the largest destinations. In addition, Qatar exports about 2 trillion cubic feet per year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for almost 20 percent of global LNG trade. Furthermore, Kuwait imports LNG volumes that travel northward through the Strait of Hormuz. These flows totaled about 100 billion cubic feet per year in 2010.At its narrowest point, the Strait is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles, separated by a two-mile buffer zone. The Strait is deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 dead weight tons. Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UnitedArab Emirates (U A E) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Gulf, and only the latter two countries currently have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent Hormuz. At the start of 2012, the total available pipeline capacity from the two countries combined, which is not utilized, was approximately 1 million bbl/d.The amount could potentially increase to 4.3 million bbl/d by the end of this year, as both countries have recently completed steps to increase standby pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait.Iraq has one major crude oil pipeline, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Iraq-Turkey) Pipeline that transports oil from the north of Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This pipeline pumped about 0.4 million bbl/d in 2011, far below its nameplate capacity of 1.6 million bbl/d and it has been the target of sabotage attacks. Moreover, this pipeline cannot send additional volumes to bypass the Strait of Hormuz unless it receives oil from southern Iraq via the Strategic Pipeline, which links northern and southern Iraq. Currently, portions of the Strategic Pipeline are closed, and renovations to the Strategic Pipeline could take several years to complete.








Saudi Arabia has the 745-mile-long Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs from across Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines with a total nameplate capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56-inch pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48-inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia recently converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch could increase Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipelinecapacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, which is only attainable if the system is able to operate at its full nameplate capacity.The UAE constructed a 1.5 million bbl/d Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline that runs from Habshan, a collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent Hormuz. The pipeline was recently opened and the first shipment of 500,000 barrels of oil was sent through the pipeline to the Fujairah oil terminal where it was loaded on a tanker and sent to the Pak-Arab Refinery in Pakistan. The pipeline will be able to export up to 1.5 million bb/d, or more than half of UAE's total net oil exports, once it reaches full operational capacity in the near future. However, the UAE does not currently have the ability to utilize this pipeline completely,until it ramps to full capacity. In late May, Fujairah ruler Sheikh Hamad bin Mohammed Al-Sharqi noted that this pipeline capacity could rise further to a maximum 1.8 million bbl/d.Saudi Arabia also has two additional pipelines that run parallel to the Petroline system and bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but neither of them have the ability to transport additional
volumes of oil should the Strait of Hormuz be closed.

STRAIT OF MALACCA:



The Strait of Malacca, located between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, links the Indian
Ocean to the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean. Malacca is the shortest sea route
between Persian Gulf suppliers and the Asian markets—notably China, Japan, South
Korea, and the Pacific Rim. Oil shipments through the Strait of Malacca supply China and
Indonesia, two of the world's fastest growing economies. It is the key choke point in Asia
with an estimated 15.2 million bbl/d flow in 2011, compared to 13.8 million bbl/d in 2007.
Crude oil makes up about 90 percent of flows, with the remainder being petroleum products.At its narrowest point in the Phillips Channel of the Singapore Strait, Malacca is only 1.7 miles wide creating a natural bottleneck, as well as potential for collisions, grounding, or oil spills. According to the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre, piracy,including attempted theft and hijackings, is a constant threat to tankers in the Strait of Malacca, although the number of attacks has dropped due to the increased patrols by the littoral states' authorities since July 2005.Over60,000 vessels transit the Strait of Malacca per year. If the strait were blocked, nearly
half of the world's fleet would be required to reroute around the Indonesian archipelago through Lombok Strait, located between the islands of Bali and Lombok, or the Sunda Strait,located between Java and Sumatra.There have been several proposals to build bypass options and reduce tanker traffic through the Strait of Malacca, but most have not been followed through. China is on
schedule to complete the Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipeline in 2013, two parallel oil and gas pipelines that stretch from Myanmar's ports in the Bay of Bengal to the Yunnan province of China. The oil pipeline will be an alternative transport route for crude oil imports from the Middle East to potentially bypass the Strait of Malacca. The oil pipeline capacity is expected to reach about 440,000 bbl/d.

SUEZ CANAL:


The Suez Canal is located in Egypt, and connects the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea, spanning 120 miles. In 2011, petroleum (both crude oil and refined products) and liquefied natural gas (LNG) accounted for 15 and 6 percent of Suez cargoes,measured by cargo tonnage, respectively.In 2011, 17,799 ships transited the Suez Canal from both directions, of which 20 percent were petroleum tankers and 6 percent were LNG tankers. Only 1,000 feet wide at its narrowest point, the Canal is unable to handle Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC) and most fully laden Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) class crude oil tankers. The table above shows weight and capacity for the different tanker types. The Suezmax was the largest ship capable of navigating through the Canal until 2010 when the Suez Canal Authority extended the depth to 66 feet to allow over 60 percent of all tankers to use the Canal, including ships that are 220,000 of dead weight tons in size.
SUMED PIPELINE:





The 200-mile long SUMED Pipeline, or Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline, provides an alternative to the Suez Canal for those cargos too large to transit through the Canal (laden VLCCs and larger).The crude oil flows through two parallel pipelines that are 42-inches in diameter, with a total pipeline capacity of around 2.4 million bbl/d. Oil flows north through Egypt, and is carried from the Ain Sukhna onshore terminal on the Red Sea coast to its end point at the Sidi Kerir terminal on the Mediterranean. The SUMED is owned by Arab Petroleum Pipeline Co., a joint venture between the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi's National Oil Company (ADNOC), and Kuwaiti companies.

The SUMED Pipeline is the only alternative route to transport crude oil from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean if ships were unable to navigate through the Suez Canal. Closure of the Suez Canal and the SUMED Pipeline would divert oil tankers around the southern tip of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, adding approximately 6,000 miles to transit, increasing both costs and shipping time. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), shipping around Africa would add 15 days of transit to Europe and 8-10 days to the United States.

BAB el MANDEB:

The Bab el-Mandab is a chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. It is located between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Most exports from the Persian Gulf that transit the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline also pass through the Bab el-Mandab.



The Bab el-Mandab is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, making tanker traffic difficult and limited to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments. Closure of the Strait could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost. In addition, closure of the Bab el-Mandab would mean that oil entering the Red Sea from Sudan and other countries could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets. This oil would instead have to go north into the Mediterranean Sea through other potential choke points, such as the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline.Security became a concern of foreign firms doing business in the region, after a French tanker was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists in October 2002. In recent years,this region has also seen rising piracy, and Somali pirates continue to attack vessels off the
northern Somali coast in the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea including the Bab el-Mandab.

TURKISH STRAITS:

The Bosporus and Dardanelles are the Turkish Straits and divide Asia from Europe. The Bosporus is a 17-mile long waterway that connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara,and the Dardanelles is a 40-mile long waterway that links the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.Traffic through the Straits increased again as crude production and exports from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan rose in recent years.Only half a mile wide at its narrowest point, the Turkish Straits are one of the world's most difficult waterways to navigate due to its sinuous geography. With 50,000 vessels, including 5,500 oil tankers, passing through the straits annually it is also one of the world's busiest choke points.While there are no current alternate routes for westward shipments from the Black and Caspian Sea region, there are several pipeline projects in various phases of development underway

PANAMA CANAL:





The Panama Canal is an important route connecting the Pacific Ocean with the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. The Canal is 50 miles long, and only 110 feet wide at its narrowest point called Culebra Cut on the Continental Divide. Over 14,000 vessels transit the Canal annually, of which more than 60 percent (by tonnage) represent United States coast-tocoast trade, along with United States trade to and from the world that passed through the Panama Canal. Closure of the Panama Canal would greatly increase transit times and costs adding over 8,000 miles of travel. Vessels would have to reroute around the Straits of Magellan, Cape Horn and Drake Passage under the tip of South America.The relevance of the Panama Canal to the global oil trade has diminished, asmany modern tankers are too large to travel through the canal.

DANISH STRAITS:

The Danish Straits are becoming an increasingly important route for Russian oil exports to
Europe.About 3 million bbl/d flowed through this waterway in 2010, with most of this flowing
westwards. Russia has increasingly been shifting its crude oil exports to its Baltic ports,especially the relatively new port of Primorsk, which accounted for half of the exports through the Straits. An estimated 0.3 million bbl/d of crude oil, primarily from Norway, flowed eastward to Scandinavian markets.About one-third of the westward exports through the Straits are for refined products, coming from Baltic Sea ports such as Tallinn (Muuga), Venstpils, and St. Petersburg.












January 15, 2013

The Hindu : Opinion / Interview : Why the middle class is revolting

The Hindu : Opinion / Interview : Why the middle class is revolting

DEVADULA LIFT IRRIGATION


Most of these reservoirs are located in Warangal district and have become a boon to the people living in the upland areas of Deccan plateau as availability of water for them remained a distant dream so far.
The reservoirs filed included Narsingapur, Bheemghanpur, Rangaiah-Yerraiah Cheruvu, Pulkurthy, Salivagu, Nashkal, Palakurthy, Nawabpet and Tapaspalli. Among them, Bommakur near Jangaon was inaugurated recently by Chief Minister N. Kiran Kumar Reddy.

On completion of these phases in all respects along with phase III, Devadula, on which Rs. 5,903 crore has been spent till date, will be able to fill another 12 reservoirs and provide water to over 6.5 lakh acres of fresh ayacut in Warangal, Karimnagar and Nalgonda districts.